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Introduction
This editorial is an assessment of the shooting of Jean Charles de Mendezes on July 22, 2005 by
London police in the belief that he was a suicide bomber. We write about it with some
trepidation. The lives of many people were terribly altered and we have little first hand knowledge
of the events. [1] However, we have been in related violent contexts, and draw upon those
events below. To add our words to the millions already written and posted is perhaps arrogant,
but also we feel, necessary, as the events teach us a great deal about surveillance societies and
their digital tools.
Simply put, in the events two men, believing themselves to be acting out of stark necessity in
defense of dozens of innocent bystanders, ended the life of a third. That man, Jean Charles de
Mendezes, was innocent of any intent to act unlawfully, and the shooting was unnecessary.
Hundreds of others—friends, families, colleagues of the shooters and their bosses, co-workers,
British politicians and readers worldwide—have been drawn into the turmoil, which is still
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unfolding as we write
Our motives are not to condemn any of the participants, but to discuss the link between digital
technology and the events. It also is an opportunity to better understand what is generally agreed
to be the world’s most conspicuous example of a digital surveillance society, London
Our research has convinced us that the shooting is a very complicated one. On the one hand, it
is easy for us to imagine a situation in which we might well die like Mr. de Mendezes. We once,
while doing research for our Ph.D. dissertation, lived and worked briefly in London, and daily took
escalators down to the tube trains just as did Mr. de Mendezes moments before his death.
He died largely because of the way he looked, dressed, and acted. For our part, we were very
much the angry anti-Vietnam war activist during our research in Europe, and could have been
easily identified, like Jean Charles, as a suspicious character. The difference in our
circumstances, we feel, is the development of the digital surveillance society and the events
which drive the need for such surveillance during the almost fifty years that separated our
descents toward the tube, I to my archives, and he to his death
Alternatively, my research makes it easy to understand that I might also, in good conscience if
mistakenly, shoot to death someone like de Mendezes, given that a similar situation somehow
transpired and I faced the same terrible choice to do so, believing this the only way to prevent
the slaughter of dozens of innocent civilians whom I had sworn to protect.
The events unfolded in a chaotic context and Jean Charles had the dreadful luck to arrive at a
fatal spot and at a fatal time. There he would meet his executioners, drawn there by a duty to
protect innocent citizens, and, we believe, by the compounded errors and uncertainties of digital
surveillance and communications.
London as a Surveillance Society: From Room 101 to Room 1600.
London is often referred to as “the CCTV (closed circuit television) capital of the world.” We
cannot find recent statistics of the total number of units deployed, probably because most such
operations are privately operated by firms like banks, malls, and local administrations, and nobody
really knows the total. The last semi-reliable estimate was four million cameras operating in 2004
for all of England. [2]
Anti-terrorist laws give the police access to all of these systems with a minimum of fuss, and
those operated by public or governmental agencies are apparently constructed to standard
specifications, making them both reliable, easy to download, and usable in legal proceedings.
They are one key to understanding the death of Mr. De Mendezes
The development of the system began with a number of threats, some ancient, some emerging.
The fear of Irish terrorists brought the government into the game, and then rising crime from
1997 to 2002 encouraged private industry and urban organizations to participate. [3] Following
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the initial rapid development of the system, some have begun to call into question not only its
efficacy, but its efficiency as well. [4]
Not all Londoners, of course, support the creation of this system. One lovely satirical send-up of
the system is reprinted here from Thomas Ricker’s posting in Engadget, “Is the UK sleep-walking
into a surveillance society? Duh.” [5]
Posted Mar 22nd 2007 10:43AM by Thomas Ricker
This composite graphic reminds us of the multiple histories of British society. These include not
only the “Troubles,” but also a strong tradition of pastoralist romanticism and fierce resistance to
the least hint of repression by public authority.
Further, for a writer who did eventually achieve that Ph.D., it is impossible to ignore literary
predecessors to Room 1600, the Special Branch command and control center in the London
headquarters of Scotland Yard. It was here that communications from the surveillance teams
who were following Mr. Mendezes in the belief that he was a suspected terrorist bomber came
in, and from there that the orders which resulted in his death went out.
Had Mr. de Mendezes survived, he might well have identified with Winston Smith, the protagonist
of George Orwell’s classic dystopian critique of totalitarian surveillance, 1984. [6] For the crime of
an unlicensed love affair leading to “thoughtcrime,” Winston was tortured in Room 101, where his
worst nightmares came true via the magic of technology.
Mr. de Mendezes died in large part because Room 1600 at Scotland Yard was where, it was
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hoped, the dreams of an effective surveillance society could be achieve via the magic of digital
technology. That technology was intended to identify a suspected terrorist suicide bomber, track,
and either capture or kill him before he could strike. [7]
The pervasiveness of surveillance in London can be seen in Jean Charles’ last hours. He left his
apartment at “9.33 hours,” in the language of the IIPC report used here. [8] Shortly after 10.02
hours, he was dead.
In those 30 minutes, he passed through the viewing fields of the following Closed Circuit
Television (CCTV) apparatus:
As he walked to the bus station he was caught by surveillance CCTV cameras outside two
different branches of the National Westminster Bank.
He boarded the #2 bus, which had 10 CCTV cameras on it.
At the Stockwell Underground station where the shooting occurred, he passed by 7
different CCTV cameras.
We will examine some of the implications and consequences of that technology below. For now,
let us just point out that any citizen taking that same path would have had his or her image
recorded repeatedly. Given that all the technology worked as planned, that image would have
been saved on tape or hard-drive at least four times in 30 minutes
Most of these systems are not particularly sophisticated by contemporary standards, but are built
to be cheap, reliable, and resistant to vandalism. Most are time-lapse in their operation, not
intended to record a complete sequence but to catch wrong doers or possible criminals in at
least several images. The great majority of these installations does not feed images in real time to
observers, but create records to be examined later in case of need
It may help the reader to see actual images from this particular series of events. These can be
downloaded at http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/page/0,,2203113,00.html (Fair warning: the
images alone are sufficiently disturbing, knowing as we do the conclusion while viewing them, but
they also eventually include shots of Jean Charles’ corpse.)
The Terrorist Context
While the London CCTV system began to deal with Irish terrorists, its main target is now Islamist
ones. The system proved to be very important following the events of July 7, 2005, when a
series of terrorist bombs were exploded on three London subways and one bus. A total of 52
people died. [9] This created a situation in which all Londoners were at a high pitch of anxiety.
Once more, I call upon personal experience in an effort to better understand events and to
empathize with all participants in them. I spent a month in Vietnam in 1968 on a tourist visa, both
doing research on early 20th century Chinese revolutionaries, and frankly, “Seeing the
Elephant”—war.
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At that time, terror bombings were commonplace in Saigon, and the public transportation I
sometimes utilized were sites of particular anxiety, because anybody could leave an explosive on
a bus, or for that matter, toss one through the window. Even parked bicycles were a cause for
concern.
122MM rockets, crude flying bombs, which were as much pointed as aimed or directed, were
fired into the city at regular intervals. One of these passed directly over the building in which I was
living, so closely as to leave burned fuel on the roof, and exploded in the next block, killing a
young French priest who had heard it coming. Unlike my friends and I who were playing cards on
the top floor and who mostly scuttled under the bed, he went to the window to see it explode
literally right in front of him.
The emotions created by incidents like those that struck London and Saigon are not easily
summarized. The intelligent reaction in Saigon, it seemed to me, was that of many Londoners—
hyper caution with a determination to somehow proceed living life as though it might not end at
any moment.
London authorities rolled out the full panoply of preventive and suppressive measures. Whereas
861 people had been stopped and questioned under the powers granted by the Terrorism Act
2000 in May, in July 4,750 were stopped. Nine thousand officer days of extra police forces were
used. For the first time, the “Level of Threat” was raised to Level 1, meaning that an attack was
expected imminently from “terrorists with an establish capability.” In this same period, citizen
reports of possible terrorists activity went from about one per week to about 1200 per week, for
a total of more than 4500 in the three weeks immediately before de Mendezes’ death on July
22. [10]
On July 21, additional terrorists attempted to detonate bombs apparently identical to those used
in the first attacks, and again on the public transport system. These bombs were not correctly
wired and failed to function. One of these terrorists, it is assumed, left a membership card for a
gymnasium in one of the bags used to transport the bombs. This man was traced to an
apartment block at 21 Scotia Road
This, then, was the context in the day immediately before the de Mendezes shooting. London
had been savagely attacked less than a month before, and a group seemingly related to the
same terrorist cell had just tried to do it again, but providentially failed. Two of the suspected
terrorists were tied to the address at 21 Scotia Road, which was now assumed to be not only a
terrorist hideout but also possibly a bomb-making factory. Jean Claude Mendezes lived at 17
Scotia Road, which may have shared an entrance with 21 Scotia Road, apparently a large
building with many apartments.
The Policy Context: Operation Kratos
London Police had developed an elaborate plan for dealing with suspected terrorists, “Operation
Kratos.” [11] Kratos (Cratus in some spellings) was the Greek god of strength and war and the
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name of a video game. [12]
Operation Kratos, developed sometime after the New York 9/11 catastrophes as a British
response to those events, was kept secret. However, it was intended in part to spell out policy
responses in which it seemed that only pre-emptive and deadly force could prevent a suicide
bombing. This policy, like all the policies and activities of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)
discussed in our primary sources, the Stockwell reports, seems architectonic and bureaucratic to
a fault. It must have appeared to the MPS that they had discussed every possible issue which
might have arisen and built in redundant levels of safeguards against error or failure.
Kratos had never been deployed, but in the alarm following the July 7 bombings, critical agencies
were updated on the policies, both via the circulation of documents and oral briefings. There
were, in the next three weeks, 250 Kratos incidents, among them seven so serious that the
order to shoot to kill might have been given, but was not. [13]
The essence of Operation Kratos, it appears, was that information would be collected and
funneled up to specially trained and prepared police officers who alone could initiate a “Kratos
shooting”. For the heightened anti-terrorist operations following July 21, Room 1600 at Scotland
Yard, headquarters of the Special Branch, was used.
During the attempt to place one of the malfunctioning bombs on July 21, the CCTV system
recorded images of the two suspects registered at 21 Scotia Road. These were judged to be
good likenesses when compared to the gym cards of the same two men. [14]
Failure to Communicate
Because of the high pitch of anxiety following the successful attacks of July 7 and the
unsuccessful ones of the 21st, a variety of police forces, including some specially briefed for
Kratos operations were mobilized and on the early morning of the 22nd, deployed at Scotia
Road.
The surveillance team was authorized in Room 1600 at 4:38 a.m. A Special Operations team
arrived at 6:04 and began surveillance. Now a series of technical and human failures began the
deadly sequence that would end in a useless death.
It must be noted that everybody assumed that communications were not an issue. The
surveillance and firearms teams all had Cougar radios, and some Met radios and mobile phones.
[15] This is important because it shows that despite the complexities of a Kratos operation, all
involved felt a successful one to be well within their capability. Yet in the end, success and failure
depended upon rapid and unambiguous information being collected and passed between multiple
actors.
At the scene at Scotia Road, the officer “Frank” had a video camera with which to image the
suspects if they emerged. However, he had unknowingly loaded a used tape, complicating later
6/26/2014 The Digital Death of Jean Charles de Mendezes | Interface
http://bcis.pacificu.edu/interface/?p=3418 7/18
examination of the record, chose to rely upon uncertain batteries when he had the opportunity to
plug into the electrical system of the van in which he was concealed, and had to link to relay the
images back to Room 1600. Between 7:26 and 11:02 he managed to video six of eight people
who exited the building.
Among the two he missed, unfortunately, was de Menezes when he emerged at 9:02, Frank
was relieving himself into a plastic container and missed getting a video shot. He grabbed for the
camera and tried to record, but did not have hands-free communications and opted rather to
radio colleagues that “it would be worth somebody else having a look.” [16]
The next surveillance officer posted in the direction de Menezes took was “Tim” who described
him as having collar length black hair, stubble, a wide face and coloring similar to a “light skinned
North African.” Had Frank gotten video and relayed it to headquarters the incident might have
ended at that point with a careful comparison of the tapes of the previous day’s failed bombings.
Osman, the actual bomber with whom de Menezes was now confused, had a beard, tightly
coiled black hair, and a decidedly long as opposed to broad face, and was in fact, much darker
than de Menezes. James, however, examining a photograph produced from the earlier
surveillance tape, said that de Menezes was “possibly identical” to the bomber.
Photo from BBC News, 23 July 2005. [17] Jean Claude de Menezes is in foreground on far right
of the group above.
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Hussain Osman, captured on a bus CCTV after his bomb failed on the Tube. He was the man
whom the police consistently tried to identify as de Mendezes. However, we do not know if this is
the photo used in the operation.
Other agents, “Tim” and “Harry” now began to observe Jean Claude, who was now said to be
looking over his shoulder and acting wary. (This probably put him into the same class as most
Londoners at that tense time, let alone those who had just been scrutinized and discussed within
fifteen minutes by at least four men.) Harry “was not able” to identify the subject as Osman, the
suspected bomber. [18]
Yet another officer, Ken, tried to get into position to view de Menezes, but his radio
malfunctioned and he could neither transmit nor hear the discussion of the others. De Menezes
boarded a bus. Another agent, “Ivor”, boarded the bus at a later stop. He sat behind the suspect
but could not positively identify him as Osman, but now added that the suspect had distinctive
“Mongolian eyes.”
Harry passed this information to the rest of the team, given that their radios were now all
functioning. For some of the teams, communications were described as “intermittent.” [19]
Among the men receiving intermittent communications was “Charlie 12″ the first man to
ultimately shoot de Menezes.
Also having radio problems was “Trojan 80,” the tactical advisor to the commander in Room
1600. Given his knowledge of Kratos planning and his personal experience, which was
considerable, he was intended to be a key link in authorizing a Kratos shooting. He was at
Scotland Yard, at least in and out of Room 1600 if not always present. He had an open mobile
line to another critical officer, “Trojan 84,” and a Cougar radio which was intermittent.
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“Trojan 80″ was in the field, trying to coordinate the information coming in from the agents, using
the mobile line to Trojan 84, an intermittent Cougar radio with other field teams, and, in addition
an open channel to the firearms teams, probably on a Met radio in a vehicle.
The confusion was such that the officer logging communications to Trojan 80 entered into his log
at 20:43 a note that “the male is “not ident (identical? Identified?) and the surveillance team will
withdraw to their original position.” [20] We understand this to mean that the team was ordered
withdrawn and de Menezes judged by somebody not to be the suspect. But events ground
forward, and the log entry was never to be explained.
“Graham” reported that the suspect was using a cell phone. (De Menezes was calling a friend to
tell him he might be late at work.) “Laurence” met up with James and Ken and said that he did
not believe de Menezes was the suspect. “Hotel 11,” another agent reported in that he believed
the suspect was Osman. The Room 1600 team would later say that at this time they believed
the suspect to be acting “nervous and twitchy.” “Pat” told Room 1600—where officers were
shouting back and forth in an effort to communicate in the room that ‘It is him, the man off the
bus. They think it is him and he is very very jumpy.”
Other specialized teams now heard that a positive identification had been made and began
converging on de Mendezes’ location. The atmosphere was such that a circumstantial argument
against Mr. de Mendezes had begun to build. He was wearing a light jacket of the sort
Americans would call a “windbreaker” probably quite comfortable on an early morning in London,
even in July. In additional conversations, this became a heavy denim jacket that might be
intended to hide a bomb. Now he was not only dark, but looked “Oriental.” [21] He went from
“wary” to “twitchy” to “very very jumpy.
As Jean Charles’ last journey continued, the highly qualified judgments made by men in the field,
including one who said that Jean Charles was “probably not” the suspect, and many who had
declined to identify him, were aggregated into one, more certain voice. He was now “probably”
the terrorist observed the previous evening. Room 1600 now believed that a positive identification
had been made and that a bomber was moving toward the tube system.
Room 1600 had not been built to be a digital war room as such, but was taken over at the last
minute for the Kratos Operation. It was noisy, various voices were shouting at each other, and in
this cacophony the officer in charge told special teams following Jean Charles, now including an
armed response team of specially alerted units, not to let him enter the tube station. He did so.
The films from CCTV video at the station are useful here.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/page/0,,2203113,00.html Again, we remind the reader of their
graphic conclusion.
It is easy to summarize the events discussed above in perhaps only one area: it can clearly be
said that they constitute a massive failure of communications, some technical in origin, some
human. The IPCC investigation of the shooting was to list among its ‘central issues’ “The
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Structure and Management of Communications.” [22]
Tragedy
The police, the final report said, had now made a number of serious errors. The entire reason for
the Kratos plan was to prevent bombs from being detonated in crowded public places. Jean
Charles could have been interviewed, taken down, immobilized at several points; but now he
was in the tube.
But the commander at 1600, as well as Trojan 80 and 84 were all totally out of touch with the
teams descending into the tube: the police radio system did not work underground, as had been
reported and cautioned against much earlier. This was to be the final failure in the
communications system that led to the shooting. The commander in 1600 understood that she
had ordered simply that the suspect be stopped. The several teams below ground believed that
a Kratos shooting had been ordered.
From this point, events are confusing and somewhat controversial. [23] Police reports stress their
repeated and loud self-identifications, their certainty of a potentially serious terror bombing similar
to those of July 7, and Jean Charles’ failure to comply. However, not one witness interviewed—
the car, while not filled, had more than 20 people on it, many sitting in Jean Charles’ vicinity—
agreed that the police had, in fact, identified themselves.
One witness thought that the police were terrorists, Ivor. The policeman mentioned above who
was also said to look Asian, was grabbed by still other police.
Jean Charles got to his feet, intending, the report speculates, to evacuate the car, as the
occupants soon came to understand they were to do. While one policeman wrapped him up and
pushed him back into his seat, Charlie 12 fired repeatedly into his head, followed by still other
officers, for a total of seven shots.
Aftermath
After much hubbub, including apparent attempts by the police and associated political hierarchy
to avoid an additional investigation, charges were brought by the Independent Police Complaints
Commission, an arm of the Crown, for breaking health and safety laws while killing de Mendezes.
[24] The IPCC report condemned the police in several regards, not only for the killing, but also for
procedural failures which might have resulted in catastrophe, had Jean Charles been, in fact, a
suicide bomber.
In the subsequent trial, digital technology continued to be central. The police introduced a series
of digital exhibits in an effort to bring the surveillance system and its digital records to their
support.
We recognize here that the origins of key digital materials are uncertain and restrict the degree of
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certainty with which we can write of these events. We are interested in one question: how much
did Hussain Osman, the conspirator with whom de Mendezes was confused, in fact resemble de
Menezes? Was a misidentification a tragic but fully understandable error or was it a series of
errors, many of which could have been prevented? Was it human failure, or was it a “Kratos
error,” a failure of the highest level to which London’s surveillance society has attempted to rise?
All photos we have seen suggest some resemblance in age and approximate height, but a
resemblance certainly far less than the certainty required to legitimate a killing.
Neither can we say that the materials we have seen are inclusive. We are not sure that we have
a reproduction of the photo circulated among the surveillance team, and neither are we certain
of that photo’s origins. It may be from a single frame of a surveillance tape; it may have been a
good copy of the identification card used at the gymnasium to which Osman had been traced
The only evidence we have states that Osman fled the station after setting the defective bomb.
He then boarded a bus and was captured on CCTV, which was, the BBC stated, to be a crucial
breakthrough in identifying him. [25] We assume that the CCTV photo shown above was,
therefore, critical to the misidentification.
At the trials concluded in October 2007, the police produced a composite photograph of Jean
Charles de Menezes and of the chief suspect for whom he was mistaken, Hussain Osman. The
police intent was to show how easy it was to confuse the two. These appear to be the photos
from which the composite was created.
On the left, Jean Charles de Mendezes; on the right, Hussain Osman. [26]
However, all evidence suggests that Osman’s photo above may not have been the one from
which the misidentification proceeded, but that it was perhaps from one of the surveillance
camera shots shown above, or possibly, from a gym card found in one of the defective bomb
bags.
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Police composite photo.
The photo below is a prosecution exhibit, marked up to show areas where, forensics consultant
Michael George argued, the photos had been “photoshopped” to digitally increase the likeness
between the two photos. [27]
Mr. George made two serious charges that further illuminate the part that digital materials played
in this event:
First, he said, ” …the police composite appeared to have a “greater definition” than the two
images used to produce it.” [28] This amounts, we assume, to a statement that a “sharpen”
command had been applied to the composite. Such a process extrapolates from digital material
that is present to add missing detail. This is particularly critical when we think of how many times
in these events the police had relied upon surveillance tapes of suspects.
The fact that we lack copies of the initial print made from the surveillance video of the
perpetrators of the failed bombings used by the police to misidentify Mr. de Mendezes now
becomes critical. We are left only to wonder if it, too, had been given “greater definition.” Neither
can we be entirely sure that the photo circulated among the surveillance teams was that from
the tape as opposed to that from the gym card found in the bag with the unexploded bomb.
Secondly, Mr. George said, “..making the image brighter has changed the image.” Here the
charge is that the two images were brought into the same register of overall brightness and
contrast, which subjectively will increase the likelihood that any viewer will accept the two
subjects of the composite photos to be two highly similar individuals.
It would also be easy to be critical of racial profiling. The police explanation for their initial interest
in Mr. de Mendezes was that he was dark, looked “Oriental,” was wearing suspicious clothing,
and seemed agitated. Of course, given the type of person the police were looking for, this would
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have been true of any suspect. And if the photo taken from the tape had been doctored to
increase definition anything might have happened. The final product may have made the suspect
look more or less like other individuals.
In an attempt to show the problems of developing identification photos from surveillance tapes
we reproduce below the digital records secured by police from CCTV installations in the tube
stations where bombs were planted. [29]
Co-conspirator Ramzi Mohammed in CCTV tape, fleeing scene of attempted bombing. [30]
Ramzi Mohammed is confronted on the Tube after his bomb fails to explode
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Yassin Omar, following his failed detonation
Osman and the three others were convicted in July 2007, of the failed bombing conspiracy.
Conclusion: The Failure of Digital Surveillance
We believe that meaningless death of an innocent individual, and the possible destruction of the
careers of several police and political officials, is not ultimately the result of individual bad
decisions. We think it was caused by a decision to rely on technology, computers, video
cameras, cell phones, communicators, all the elements of the London surveillance system, to
solve human problems.
Many might argue, however, that more and better technology, properly employed, might have
prevented the tragedy. Such failures as that the police relied upon a bad graphic, did not send
back to room 1600 actual videos of Jean Claude to be compared under ideal conditions with the
images of the suspected terrorists, that the police could not communicate effectively among
themselves leading to a false strong positive being erroneously communicated to room 1600, and
that the police descending into the tube were given ambiguous orders, and that they then were
out of communications with other units—that these were all preventable problems.
Upon first reading of Room 1600, my initial mental image was of a highly digitized war room,
staffed by calm well-trained technicians connected by instant communication with thoughtful
seasoned police veterans protecting the British public.
Ultimately, of course, this is an image derived from many popular films. These are the sorts of
images that make the surveillance society appealing. It has worked for any number of movie
heroes, why shouldn’t it work for us?
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The reality was, of course, a commandeered room with excited individuals shouting at each
other, in poor communications with even each other, let alone with the field personnel. And the
field operations were close to pure chaos, themselves akin to other, older film images of the
Keystone Cops.
However, this editorial is emphatically not a plea for better technology. It is an argument that
technology can only go so far in solving our problems, and that the surveillance society, however
well established, will inevitably produce senseless tragedies.
No matter how sophisticated our digital servants become, at some point a fallible human being,
or worse, a mob of highly excited fallible human being will have to make a critical decision: To
shoot, or not to shoot.
We believe that the de Mendezes shooting properly should be the high-water mark of digital
surveillance societies. But the aftermath of the London shooting strongly suggests that this will
not be the case. The distribution of blame among individuals leaves the true cause, the over-
reliance upon digital devices, their processes and products, free to go.
Endnotes
[1] We are, as well, operating from a limited database. Our primary source of information has
been the Nov. 7, 2007 release of the “Stockwell One” report of the Independent Police
Complaints Commission (IPCC) For the pages of the IPCC and a source for downloadable reports
bearing on the events, see: http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/ Our other sources of information have been
a series of reports and articles in the English paper, The Guardian, on line edition, and in the on-
line editions of the BBC world news. The Guardian is regarded both as one of the few truly
international on-line newspapers, and as a left-leaning one. For The Guardian, go to:
http://www.guardian.co.uk The de Mendezes reports, continually updated, can be accessed
from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/menezes/0,,1691452,00.html
[2] See Button, James, “How London Became the world’s CCTV Capital” Theage.com.au at:
http://www.theage.com.au/news/war-on-terror/how-london-became-the-world146s-cctv-
capital/2005/07/25/1122143780626.html#
[3] The best single source we have seen on this development is Michael McCahill and Clive
Norris, “CCTV in London,” Working Paper No.6. www.Urbaneye.net. The report can be
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This site was… how do I say it? Relevant!! Finally I’ve found something that helped me.
Thanks a lot!
